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Abstract. Escalation of commitment (EOC) is a common behavior among investors who receive negative feedback (NF) 
in public-private partnership (PPP) projects, and this behavior typically leads to sizable losses. Recognizing this, investors 
set a mental threshold and track investments for escalation. Once losses reach the threshold, investors will terminate the 
escalation behavior, namely, they will transfer projects to governments to obtain compensation or residual asset value. This 
paper analyzes the maximum amount of NF that investors can sustain based on a belief-adjustment model, followed by the 
analysis of the greatest loss degree. Then, a threshold model for EOC is constructed using real option thinking. Different 
from the usual judgment criteria of the traditional option method, the threshold is less than zero in the EOC scenario. The 
results show that the threshold correlates with the initial generative cognition, the sunk cost level, the degree of the gov-
ernment guarantee and investors’ behavioral preferences as well as with total investment and return on investment. These 
findings serve as a reference for governments to de-escalate investors’ commitment in PPP projects.
Keywords: public-private partnership projects, escalation of commitment, real option theory, threshold, abandonment op-
tion, early termination pricing.
Introduction
Public-private partnership (PPP) schemes have been 
widely applied worldwide in many fields, such as toll 
roads, water plants and energy infrastructure (e.g., Bi-
ygautane et al., 2019; Carbonara & Pellegrino, 2018, 2019; 
Feng et  al., 2015; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2018; Song et  al., 
2015; Valipour et  al., 2019; Villani et  al., 2017). Despite 
the advantages of PPP arrangements, private investors are 
assuming great risks and uncertainties due to the large 
scale of investment and long payback period (Liu et al., 
2014); consequently, they may often require mitigation of 
these risks through guarantees provided by governments 
to compensate for possible private losses (Carbonara & 
Pellegrino, 2018; Liu et al., 2019b; Pellegrino et al., 2019; 
Zapata Quimbayo et al., 2019). Nevertheless, investors of-
ten receive negative feedback (NF) in PPP projects such 
as low market payoffs, schedule delays and budget over-
runs, implying that these projects are likely to fail (Zhang 
et al., 2003). In this context, one of the most frustrating 
decisions that investors must make is whether to contin-
ue projects in the face of uncertain prospects (Keil et al., 
2000). Sometimes, to maintain their own reputation and 
retrieve losses, investors choose to continue by escalating 
commitment in response to sunk costs (including con-
siderable past efforts and major existing investments) in 
social-economic activities (Hafenbrädl & Woike, 2018; 
Staats et al., 2018), such as the Denver International Air-
port (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Such irrational behavior 
is a general phenomenon known as escalation of commit-
ment (EOC) (Staw, 1976). EOC by private investors is also 
a common behavioral trap in PPP projects. For example, 
in the Taraso Fukuoka project, estimates of the number 
of project users were overoptimistic, and when faced with 
the low actual income, investors revised the project’s fa-
cilities, operating methods and content, and also replaced 
the external operating companies to reverse the situation, 
which despite their efforts ended in bankruptcy (Song 
et al., 2018). Similarly, when the Channel Fixed Link and 
Quanzhou Citong Bridge encountered operational diffi-
culties, investors extended the schedule and budget, only 
to find themselves trapped, leading to an enormous waste 
of resources and substantial losses for project stakeholders 
and even the public (Song et al., 2018; Winch, 2013). EOC 
by investors not only results in an increase in project risks 
and a decline in performance but also leads to project fail-
ure in severe cases (Feldman & Wong, 2018).
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However, EOC is not a robust phenomenon and typi-
cally occurs only in the early stages of PPP projects when 
investors are attempting to interpret NF (McCain, 1986). 
With the increased NF, projects are likely to fail more ob-
viously, and the losses borne by investors also increase. 
Once losses accumulate to a certain extent (the so-called 
threshold), investors will terminate their EOC, thereby 
abandoning projects and transferring them to govern-
ments to receive some compensation or residual asset 
value. Investors usually have the right, but no obligation, 
to require governments to take over projects in advance as 
initially agreed, which can be defined as an abandonment 
option and also a put option (Xiong et al., 2015). In real 
option theory, investors are assumed to make decisions 
from a rational and probabilistic perspective (Garvin & 
Ford, 2012). Nevertheless, this assumption is not always 
tenable, for instance, when considering managerial be-
havior such as EOC (Herder et al., 2011; Triantis, 2005). 
Investors may preclude the exercise of the abandonment 
option due to personal incentives (such as a promotion), 
even when that choice might be optimal for them, i.e., 
when the project value with option is zero (Dahan & 
Mendelson, 2001). Different from traditional real option 
theory, in an EOC scenario, the critical condition whereby 
investors terminate PPP projects is no longer that the pro-
ject value is equal to zero; instead, some losses are accept-
able, namely, the termination threshold is less than zero.
The escalation behavior of investors is a vital and 
complex issue. Decades of research have explained EOC 
from different perspectives, such as cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1962), psychological commitment the-
ory (Kiesler, 1971), self-justification theory (Staw, 1976), 
mental budgeting theory (Heath, 1995) and prospect the-
ory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). EOC is determined by 
various factors, such as sunk costs (Chung & Cheng, 2018; 
Keil et  al., 1995; Moon, 2001; Staats et  al., 2018), guar-
antees (Zardkoohi, 2004), information asymmetry (Berg 
et  al., 2009), self-esteem (Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 
2014), anticipated regret (Sarangee et al., 2019; Wong & 
Kwong, 2007), ego depletion (Lee et  al., 2018), paradox 
mindset (Wong & Kwong, 2018), reward and punishment 
mechanism (Liu et  al., 2019a), the decision responsibil-
ity and decision-maker involved (Boulding et al., 2016), 
competitors (Hsieh et al., 2015), risk preferences (Whyte, 
1986) and cultural backgrounds (Drummond, 2014). Con-
clusively, current studies on EOC have focused on theo-
retical explanations and influential determinants while 
remaining relatively silent on the threshold for investors’ 
EOC.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to construct a 
threshold model of investors’ EOC in PPP projects using 
real option thinking to present the maximum losses that 
investors can sustain. The findings will serve as a reference 
for governments to de-escalate investors’ commitment. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, 
a comprehensive literature review on EOC and real op-
tion theory is presented. Next, a belief-adjustment model 
is constructed to illustrate the maximum amount of NF 
that investors can sustain, and then a real option model 
of the threshold for investors’ EOC is developed, followed 
by model analysis and discussions. A numerical example 
is then provided to illustrate the feasibility and applica-
tion of these models. Finally, this paper concludes with 
a summary of the findings and recommendations for the 
de-escalation of commitment.
1. Literature review
1.1. Escalation of commitment (EOC)
EOC, first proposed by Staw (1976), is a common but irra-
tional phenomenon in decision-making (Chung & Cheng, 
2018; Sleesman et al., 2018; Wong & Kwong, 2018). Three 
typical features in an EOC scenario have been defined: 
sunk costs such as money, time and even self-identities 
have been invested; investors have received NF about pro-
jects; and investors must decide whether to continue in-
vesting or to completely withdraw from projects (i.e., quit 
investing) (Brockner, 1992; Jani, 2011).
Many theories have been proposed to explain such be-
havior. Couched originally in cognitive dissonance theory 
by Festinger (1962) and psychological commitment theory 
by Kiesler (1971), investors develop a generative cogni-
tion toward the initial decision when investing in a PPP 
project, meaning a belief that the expected project profits 
will be realized (Festinger, 1962). As the project proceeds, 
if the subsequent feedback is inconsistent with the gen-
erative cognition (e.g., policy changes make it difficult to 
maintain project performance, and thus the project should 
be abandoned), dissonant cognition arises, which refers to 
the psychological conflict when real-world situation con-
tradicts the psychological ideas or assumptions (Festinger, 
1962). In such a case, investors will re-evaluate the pro-
ject to reduce and even eliminate the discomfort brought 
about by the dissonant cognition. If generative cognition 
exceeds dissonant cognition, investors will continue to in-
vest, and EOC will prevail in PPP projects. Derived from 
cognitive dissonance theory and psychological commit-
ment theory, Staw (1976) proposed self-justification the-
ory, which holds that investors make certain decisions 
based on the expected positive outcomes. When receiv-
ing NF, investors are unwilling to admit that their previ-
ous decisions were incorrect, and therefore will persist in 
their commitments to those decisions to maintain their 
internal and external justification (Bobocel & Meyer, 1994; 
Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981). In addition, prospect theory 
claims that investors manifest risk-seeking behavior when 
faced with a prospect of losses upon being presented with 
NF (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The mental budgeting 
reveals that only when the losses arising from EOC reach 
investors’ threshold will they terminate EOC and abandon 
projects (Heath, 1995).
From an approach-avoidance perspective, Pan et  al. 
(2009) presented an integrated theoretical process model 
for identifying, describing, and analyzing complex escala-
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tion phenomena. Project management constructs also play 
an important role in escalation (Keil et al., 2003). Addi-
tionally, organizational climate and information asym-
metry in individualistic and collectivistic culture are both 
important determinants (Tan et  al., 2003). In practice, 
escalation could be viewed as an approach to avoiding 
conflicts (Pan et al., 2006). Escalation behavior is driven 
by many determinants. Typically, EOC involves the inter-
play of four sets of forces over time (Ross & Staw, 1993). 
Under this rubric, project determinants are objective as-
pects of a project, such as the sunk cost (Chung & Cheng, 
2018; Moon, 2001; Staats et al., 2018), guarantees (Zard-
koohi, 2004), information asymmetry (Berg et al., 2009), 
reward and punishment mechanism (Liu et  al., 2019a), 
and salvage value (Ross & Staw, 1993). The psychologi-
cal determinants mainly refer to personalities, emotional 
elements and cognitive styles of investors, including self-
esteem (Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014), ego depletion 
(Lee et al., 2018), neuroticism (Moon et al., 2003b), antici-
pated regret (Sarangee et al., 2019; Wong & Kwong, 2007), 
paradox mindset (Wong & Kwong, 2018), risk preference 
(Whyte, 1986) and rational thinking style (Wong et  al., 
2008). Organizational determinants embrace such varia-
bles as political supports within an organization, including 
the decision responsibility and decision-maker involved 
(Boulding et al., 2016), the agency (Sleesman et al., 2012), 
the group decision process and incrementalism (Moon 
et  al., 2003a) etc. In terms of social determinants, this 
category contains interpersonal processes, reflecting the 
social, political, economic and cultural environment that 
may result in excess commitment, for instance, competi-
tors (Hsieh et al., 2015), and cultural backgrounds (Drum-
mond, 2014). In a nutshell, all of these works offer a theo-
retical basis for reducing this irrational behavior.
1.2. Real option theory
Real option theory evolves from financial option. By defi-
nition, real option is a right, not an obligation, to buy or 
sell real assets only when profitable (Bloom, 2009). Simi-
lar to financial options, real option holders can execute 
the option at a fixed price agreed upon by both parties, 
which is called a strike price and usually stipulated in the 
contract. Quite simply, there are two basic types of real 
options: call and put options. In call options, the owners 
have the right to purchase when the market price of an as-
set is higher than the strike price, whereas in put options, 
the owners can execute the right to sell at the strike price 
even when it exceeds the market price. From the perspec-
tive of option execution time, if an option can only be 
exercised on the expiration date agreed upon previously, 
it is known as a “European option”; otherwise, if it can 
be exercised at any time prior to the expiration date, it 
is known as an “American option”. In practical projects, 
real options can be categorized into many different types 
including growth options and abandonment options etc. 
(Martins et al., 2013; Nunes & Pimentel, 2017).
Real option theory is well known for capitalizing on 
uncertainties and risks through strategic investments and 
contracts (Brouthers & Dikova, 2010; Buyukyoran & Gun-
des, 2018; Li et al., 2017; Morreale et al., 2017; Trigeorgis 
& Tsekrekos, 2018). Thus, option thinking can be used to 
proactively design and manage strategic investments (At-
tarzadeh et al., 2017; Galera & Soliño, 2010). In general, 
the investment value of projects increases in the consid-
eration of managerial flexibility (Aretz & Pope, 2018). 
That is, the potential execution of options adds some ad-
ditional values to projects that cannot be easily captured 
using traditional procedures. Due to the irreversibility of 
investment projects and the uncertainty of future payoffs, 
Guo et al. (2019) proposed an optimal scheme for energy 
performance contracting through the incorporation of 
real option analysis. When facing uncertainties (e.g., en-
ergy price and policy fluctuations), real option theory can 
be used to conduct project evaluation to address the issue 
of investment decisions (Yao et al., 2019). Likewise, time-
to-build investments could be predicted to be delayed over 
future revenue (Oh & Yoon, 2020). Simultaneously con-
sidering the option to defer and the option to abandon, Yu 
et al. (2019) constructed a real option model for geother-
mal heating investment decision-making that incorporates 
carbon trading and resource taxes.
To date, real option theory has been widely applied 
worldwide to evaluate government guarantees and pro-
vide supports to mitigate the risks of PPP projects (Collan 
et al., 2016). Cruz and Marques (2013) addressed contract 
flexibility and its incorporation into PPP arrangements 
through a proposed double entry matrix. In fact, there 
are many forms of guarantees for different risks in PPP 
projects. For instance, an intensive study on maximum 
interest rate guarantees revealed that the optimal value 
of the interest rate cap could be set through real options 
(Pellegrino et al., 2019). In a study examining a restric-
tive agreement, Liu et al. (2014) employed a real option 
approach to determine the value of restrictive competi-
tion guarantees. Using PPP rental retirement villages as 
an example, Liu et  al. (2019b) explained compensation 
and guarantee costs while considering benefit redistribu-
tion when governments are unable to keep their promises 
regarding guarantee provision. With a focus on toll road 
infrastructure, the implications of PPP agreements for the 
execution of expansion options were examined by Krüger 
(2012) to promote a social optimal outcome. Treating traf-
fic as the underlying asset from a real option perspective, 
an estimate of the minimum traffic guarantee value can be 
obtained (Galera & Soliño, 2010); and subsequently, the 
risk-allocation mechanisms can be formulated (Brandão 
et al., 2012). Moreover, the binomial lattice has proven to 
be a valid tool to obtain a more robust and comprehensive 
model for PPP projects (Jeong et al., 2015).
Additionally, minimum revenue guarantees (MRGs) 
are also granted to increase the viability and reduce the 
risks of PPP projects (Wang et al., 2019). Marzouk and 
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 24(5): 348–364 351
Ali (2018) identified MRG values under a mix of con-
tractual conditions. However, evaluations of such gov-
ernment guarantees using the real options approach of-
ten make the basic assumption that traffic volume follows 
a geometric Brownian motion, and this assumption is 
not always tenable. By applying statistical tests to check 
the validity of this assumption, Zapata Quimbayo et al. 
(2019) innovatively showed how toll road traffic can be 
modelled under alternate models to define the fair value 
of MRGs secured by governments. To avoid excessive 
guarantees to place an increased burden on the public 
budget, both the optimum upper and lower boundaries 
of compound MRG and maximum revenue cap (MRC) 
options should be identified, which helps to establish a 
fair risk allocation structure and further create a win-
win contract (Ashuri et al., 2011; Buyukyoran & Gundes, 
2018; Carbonara & Pellegrino, 2018). In application, the 
combination integration of real options and other ad-
vanced techniques, e.g., continuous stochastic approach-
es, is conducive to developing a more efficient valuation 
approach to reserve budget for government guarantees 
(Almassi et al., 2012). In short, real option theory is an 
efficient way to analyze government guarantees and miti-
gate PPP risks.
1.3. Relationship between EOC and real options
In PPP projects, instead of transferring projects to gov-
ernments, investors are often likely to escalate their com-
mitment in response to NF given the considerable efforts 
and financial resources they have invested, typically al-
lowing some degree of losses for themselves. Nonethe-
less, since EOC generates major losses for investors, 
such behavior will disappear once the level of NF and 
the losses reach a threshold beyond what investors can 
sustain. At this point, investors will exercise their aban-
donment option by terminating the commitment to PPP 
projects and transfer the projects to governments to re-
cover the salvage value and avoid further losses (Xiong 
et al., 2015). In cases where potential losses are relatively 
small, the option to abandon is virtually worthless, and 
early EOC may, counterintuitively, provide a strategic 
advantage (Dahan & Mendelson, 2001).
The abandonment option requires investors to ac-
quire the ability to abandon a current operation perma-
nently (Martins et  al., 2013). Exactly in PPP projects, 
due to the embedded uncertainties and risks, investors 
typically own the right to require governments to take 
over the project as initially agreed in advance in cases 
where the project construction or operation cannot be 
maintained continuously, but with no obligations ac-
cordingly (Iossa et  al., 2007). Especially in an escala-
tion scenario of PPP projects with poorer performance, 
private investors can abandon and withdraw from these 
projects at any time. In this sense, the early termination 
right held by investors is an American put option (Liu 
et al., 2017).
1.4. Research questions
As EOC may entail a considerable waste of resources for 
both investors and the public, de-escalation of commit-
ment potentially presents a more important issue than 
escalation to some degree (G. Pan & S. L. Pan, 2011). In 
an EOC scenario, decisions can be deemed progress deci-
sions and require temporal elements (Moon, 2001). Al-
though government guarantees are typically in place dur-
ing cooperation of PPP projects, early termination may 
be inevitable with sequential NF and the integration of 
multiple determinants. Private investors need to make a 
series of decisions, including the degree of losses and early 
termination (Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014; Staw & 
Ross, 1989). Nevertheless, the vast majority of prevailing 
studies have been devoted to theoretical explanations and 
different determinants of EOC, but few studies analyze 
the termination threshold and project value for investors’ 
EOC in PPP projects. From the perspective of real option 
theory, prior studies have focused on external facts, such 
as the minimum demand guarantee and MRG, while ig-
noring the behavior of private investors in PPP projects. 
More importantly, the relationship between the escalation 
behavior of investors in PPP projects and real options has 
been overlooked. Indeed, the early termination right of 
private investors that can be exercised at any time to trans-
fer the project to governments is an option to abandon 
and an American put option.
To bridge the gaps in the extant literature, this paper 
incorporates such escalation behavior of private investors 
into the real option model. Specifically, the research ques-
tions include two parts: one is to identify the termination 
threshold for investors’ EOC in view of the peculiarity of 
PPP projects, and the other is to illustrate the project value 
with an abandonment option in the EOC scenario. The 
main contributions of this paper are to analyze the subjec-
tive escalation behavior of investors in PPP projects and 
then incorporate this behavior into the real option model. 
As a result, the critical condition for investors’ escalation 
termination is different from that in traditional real option 
theory, and it is no longer the case that the value of a project 
with an option is zero; instead, some losses are allowable, 
namely, the threshold is less than zero. The findings can 
serve as a reference for both governments and investors to 
collectively curb potential escalation behavior and work 
toward improving governance efficiency in PPP projects.
2. Modeling and solutions
2.1. Option modeling with EOC in PPP projects
When receiving NF regarding PPP projects, according to 
real option theory, investors should terminate projects im-
mediately once the project value including expanded value 
is zero. Despite this logic, investors still opt to persist in 
projects, which means EOC occurs. Meanwhile, investors 
presuppose a psychological threshold (denoted by lowV ) 
and will track investments for escalation. Once the losses 
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from escalation reach a certain point, they will terminate 
PPP projects and transfer them to governments. Thus, in 
an escalation scenario for PPP projects, investors own the 
right to abandon projects once the project value with op-
tion is negative. At the point of the termination, the losses 
are investors’ threshold for EOC, being the largest losses 
that investors can sustain.
With continuous NF, regardless of whether to contin-
ue EOC, investors can obtain the project value from the 
first stage, expressed as NPVΙ  (Figure 1). When investors 
choose to abandon EOC, they may obtain some compen-
sation from governments or the residual asset value (ex-
pressed by K) to recoup losses but will relinquish the net 
present value of the project earnings during the remain-
ing concession period (denoted by rNPV ). As depicted 
in Figure 2, EOCV  is the value with the abandonment op-
tion of PPP projects with EOC and lowV  represents the 
termination threshold for investors’ EOC. The initial PPP 
project value with option from the beginning EOCV  will 
jump upward to EOCV +  with probability p or downward to 
EOCV −  with probability 1 – p, where EOC EOC EOCV V V− +< <  
and 0 1p≤ ≤ .
Suppose that the government compensation for early 
termination initiated by investors is atP , the net present 
value of which is K, as shown in Figure 3. In the traditional 
real option method, the execution condition of a put op-
tion is 0S X− ≤ , which indicates that only when the asset 
value (S) is no more than the strike price (X) will investors 
abandon the project. Differently, in the EOC scenario, a 
certain degree of losses is allowable and investors’ termi-
nation condition is 0lowV < , i.e., only when the total net 
present value ( rNPV NPVΙ + ) is less than the strike price 
(K) by a certain extent, i.e., r lowNPV NPV K VΙ + − ≤ , will 
investors cease EOC in PPP projects, signifying that the 
execution interval of options is smaller with the reduction 
interval being exactly the absolute value of lowV .
2.2. Determination of threshold for EOC in PPP 
projects
Suppose that investors have initially invested partial funds 
in a PPP project at t0, and their initial generative cogni-
tion regarding this project is S0 . Due to uncertainties and 
risks, investors may continuously receive NF denoted by 
k ( 1,2,...k = ) in the process of the project, such as severe 
cost overruns, significant schedule delays or policy chang-
es, indicating that this project is likely to fail. If investors’ 
generative cognition exceeds their dissonant cognition, 
they will continue to invest in the PPP project, so EOC 
will persist; in contrast, EOC will be terminated (Festing-
er, 1962; Kiesler, 1971), as shown in Figure 4.
Based on the belief-adjustment model of human in-
formation processing (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), inves-
tors usually adopt a stepwise reaction model to process 
each piece of NF in PPP projects. As depicted in Figure 5, 
Sk is the degree to which investors adjust their beliefs 
in terms of impression or attitude after evaluating the k 
pieces of NF, and 0 1kS≤ ≤ . 1kS −  is the investors’ genera-
tive cognition with respect to the kth piece of NF. ak rep-
resents the evidentiary weight of the kth piece of NF, and 
0 1ka≤ ≤ ; the greater ak is, the stronger the evidentiary 
weight. kϕ  is investors’ acceptance degree of the kth piece 
of NF and 0 1k≤ ϕ ≤ . ( )kS a  represents the subjective 
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Figure 1. Time series of investors’ EOC in PPP projects
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Figure 3. Payoff function for EOC at maturity in PPP projects
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Generally, ( )kS a  varies with different attitudes toward 
risks, background knowledge and the environment and 
improves with the increased evidentiary weight ak (Tang 
& Liu, 2008). Facing ongoing NF, investors’ generative 
cognition regarding the project will decrease gradually as 
follows (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992):
( )1 1k k k k kS S S S a− −= −ϕ ⋅ ⋅ . (1)
Starting with the initial generative cognition S0, each 
piece of NF is processed successively. Upon receiving the 
kth piece of NF, the generative cognition of this project will 
fall from S0 to 1kS − , i.e., 1 2 1 00 ... 1k kS S S S S−≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ . 
Assume that when investors receive k0piece of NF, the crit-
ical condition for terminating EOC is just met, that is, 
the generative cognition becomes equal to the dissonant 
cognition, as follows:
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( )0 01k kS S a− = . (2)
Therefore, considering the conditions laid out above, 
the boundary condition for EOC is:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0 0
0 0
1 1 1 2
0 1 1 2 2
1 1
1
                      ...
                      1 1 ...
1 .
k k k k k
k k
S a S S a S
S S a S a
S a
− − − −
− −
 = = −ϕ ⋅ ⋅  
=
   = ⋅ − ϕ ⋅ ⋅ − ϕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   
 − ϕ ⋅    
(3)
As stated above, ak is the evidentiary weight of the kth 
piece of NF. If 0k = , 0ka = . In PPP projects, when k is 
fewer initially, ak is also low, but as increasing amounts 
of NF emerge, the probability of project failure increases. 
That is, the evidentiary weight (ak) is gradually stronger. 
When k is relatively small, the growth rate of ak is slow; 
with the increased k, ak improves rapidly. Thus, ak is a 
monotone incremental function of k, and the growth rate 
of ak is accelerating, which can be expressed as follows:
2
1ka m k= , (4)
where the coefficient 1 0m > .
The acceptance degree of NF by investors ( kϕ ) is 
negatively related to the willingness to escalate (wk). The 
stronger wk is, the lower kϕ , which can be expressed as 
follows:
1 1k kn w lϕ = + , (5)
where 0 1kw≤ ≤  and the coefficient 1 0n < . When wk 
is extremely small, for instance 0kw = , kϕ  is the great-
est, i.e., 
max 1k
lϕ = , and thereby 10 1l≤ ≤ . wk is affected 
by many determinants, such as risk preferences (Jani, 
2008; Wong, 2005) and self-esteem level (Schaumberg 
& Wiltermuth, 2014) etc. As these subjective psychologi-
cal characteristics of private investors are typically stable, 
mainly affecting their dissonant cognition (see below for 
details), the analysis of wk only addresses objective factors. 
With the escalation decision point as the dividing point, 
the determinants consist of three categories, including 
the past sunk cost level ck (Chung & Cheng, 2018; Rut-
ten et al., 2014; Staw & Ross, 1987; Westfall et al., 2012), 
the current evidentiary weight ak and the future govern-
ment guarantee degree G (Wang & Liu, 2015; Wang et al., 
2018). Specifically, representing the effect of past factors 
on decision-making, the value of kc  is equal to the ratio 
of all sunk cost utility to the expected full input utility, 
and 0kc > ; the value of G equals the absolute value of 
the ratio of government guarantees to the actual profits 
and 0,1G∈   .
According to the literature review, investors usually 
escalate their commitment in response to sunk costs. 
Initially, when the sunk cost level (ck) of the PPP project 
is low, investors’ willingness to escalate (wk) is relatively 
strong. With the increased ck, wk gradually declines, but 
the rate of the latter reduction is slower. However, when 
ck increases to a certain extent and investors clearly per-
ceive that PPP projects are likely to fail, their willingness 
to escalate (wk) rapidly decreases. Thus, the monotonic de-
creasing relationship between wk and ck can be described 
by a quadratic function with an inverse u-shape. With 
regard to the evidentiary weight ak, a stronger ak means 
greater credibility of the project failure, thereby leading to 
a weaker wk to continue projects. That is, wk is negatively 
correlated with ak. Moreover, as higher guarantees help 
reduce project risks and losses, wk also improves with G in 
the future. Considering the three determinants are classi-
fied based on the time point of re-decision-making, these 
determinants are independent and do not interfere with 
one another. As a result, the relationship among wk and 
ck, ak and G can be expressed as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )22 2 2 3 3 4k kkw m c l n a l n G l= + + + + + , (6)
where the coefficient 2 0m < , 2 0,1l ∈   , 2 0n < , 3 0,1l ∈   , 
3 0n >  and 4 0,1l ∈   .
According to Eqs. (4) to (6), the acceptance degree kϕ  
is derived as follows:
2 2
1 2 3 4k kc k Gϕ = ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ , (7)
where: 1 2 1m nζ = , 2 1 1 2m n nζ = , 3 1 3n nζ = − , 
( )4 1 2 3 4 1n l l l lζ = + + +  and 1 2 3, , 0ζ ζ ζ > .
As dissonant cognition ( )kS a  improves with the in-
creased evidentiary weight ak and drawing on the value 
function of cumulative prospect theory focusing on the 
psychological determinants (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
the dissonant cognition ( )kS a  can be expressed as fol-
lows:
( ) ( ) ( )21k kS a a m k ββ= λ = λ , (8)
where: β is the risk attitude coefficient of investors 
( 0 1≤ β ≤ ) and λ is the risk aversion coefficient ( 1λ > ).
According to Eqs. (7) and (8), investors’ generative 
cognition for the k0th piece of NF can be inferred as fol-
lows:















 = − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ  
∏ . (9)
Then, the critical condition for terminating EOC by 
investors in the PPP project is:
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
2 2 2 2






S c i G m i m k
− β β
=
 − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ = λ  
∏ .
(10)
Given that each piece of NF is processed successively 
based on the initial generative cognition 0S , there always 
exists a minimum k0 ( 0 0k ≥ ) that satisfies Eq. (10), which 
is the greatest amount of NF that investors can tolerate. 
When the actual amount of NF received k is not more 
than k0 ( 0k k< ), investors’ generative cognition exceeds 
the dissonant cognition, and then they will escalate their 
commitment to the PPP project. With the continuous NF 
received, the generative cognition of the project gradually 
decreases. Until k0 pieces of NF occur, generative cogni-
tion no longer exceeds dissonant cognition, and the inves-
tors will terminate the project.
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When receiving the k0th piece of NF, the generative 
cognition is minS , as shown in Eq. (11), which is the low-
est generative cognition accepted by the investors with 
regard to the PPP project.















 = = − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ <  
∏ .
(11)
In the EOC scenario of PPP projects, the greatest de-
gree of losses ( 0ε ) that investors can sustain is:
( ) ( )
0 1
min 0 2 2 2















where 01 0− ≤ ε ≤ . The negative symbol represents losses, 
and the absolute value represents the greatest acceptable 
degree of investors’ losses.
Assume that the return on investment for the PPP pro-
ject is ( )
o
R f t= . This implies that 
o
R  is a function of time 
t (typically, R increases with t and vice versa) (Liu et al., 
2017). Generally, the longer the operation period (t), the 
higher the actual cash flows and then the higher R will 
be. In such a case, the termination threshold ( lowV ) for 
the escalation behavior is:
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
2 2 2







V I R I f t c i G m i
− β
=
   = ⋅ ⋅ ε = ⋅ ⋅ − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ −     
∏ ,
(13)
where: I is the total investment of the project.
To sum up, the definitions of these relevant parameters 
are presented in Table 1.
Investors’ dissonant cognition ( ) ( ) ( )21k kS a a m k ββ= λ = λ 
( ) ( ) ( )21k kS a a m k ββ= λ = λ  improves with the increased evidentiary weight 
ak and further with the increased amount of NF (k) in PPP 
projects. If ( )1 1m
βλ =  with 1k = , the evidentiary weight 
of NF is strong enough to cause investors’ minimum dis-
sonant cognition to reach the highest intensity of one. 
Once the investors receive NF, the dissonant cognition 
becomes intense, and they will definitely abandon the pro-
ject. In this scenario, the investors will not escalate their 
commitment. On the contrary, if ( )21m k βλ  is extremely 
small whatever k is, for instance ( )21 0m k βλ = , ak is too 
weak to result in dissonant cognition of private investors, 
and they will accordingly not escalate their commitment 
(Tang & Liu, 2008). As such, when escalation behavior 
occurs, the investors’ dissonant cognition on the project 
must satisfy the condition ( )210 1m k β< λ < .
For private investors, the greatest toler-
able amount of NF (k0) satisfies the condition 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
2 2 2 2






S c i G m i m k
− β β
=
 − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ = λ  
∏ . 
In this sense, k0 is positively related to the investors’ initial 
generative cognition (S0). The higher S0 is, the greater k0 
will be. If initial generative cognition (S0) becomes suf-
ficiently low that it equals the weakest dissonant cogni-
tion ( )1m
βλ  when 1k = , i.e. ( )0 1S m
β= λ , the first piece 
of NF presented will exceed investors’ largest tolerable 
quantity. In this case, the investors will not escalate their 
commitment and will abandon the project upon receipt of 
NF. When such initial generative cognition (S0) is great-
er than the weakest dissonant cognition generated with 
1k = , i.e. ( )0 1S m
β> λ , then 0 2k ≥ . In other words, the 
investors will persist in PPP projects upon receiving, at 
least, the first piece of NF, thereby engaging in escalation 
behavior. Based on k0, the threshold is determined, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
2 2 2







V I R I f t c i G m i
− β
=
   = ε = ⋅ ⋅ − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ −     
∏ . 
In summary, the threshold is influenced by various factors 
as described below.
(1) The absolute value of the threshold for investors’ 
EOC ( lowV ) is positively related to the total invest-
ment (I). The larger I is, particularly the greater the sunk 
cost, the more willing an investor is to engage in EOC. 
The sunk cost effect is present in the escalation scenario 
(Heath, 1995; Karlsson et  al., 2005; Ku et  al., 2005). To 
avoid acknowledging that these resources have been wast-
ed, investors persist in their investments. As sunk costs 
increase, the greatest losses that investors can sustain be-
come increasingly severe, and hence lowV  will increase.
(2) The threshold range lowV  expands as the return 
on investment (R) in the PPP project increases and is 
further positively correlated with the period t because 
( )
o
R f t=  and 
o
R  is an increasing function of t. The long-
er t, the higher 
o
R  should be. According to expectancy 
theory (Vroom, 1964), investors will invest even more re-
sources based on their targeted return on investment, and 
then lowV  increases, leading to increasingly significant 
escalation behavior.
(3) Contrary to intuition, the government guaran-
tee level G will not reduce investors’ losses in PPP pro-
jects. As depicted in Eqs. (7) and (9), when G declines 
and other parameters remain unchanged, the value of 
( ) ( )2 2 21 2 3 4 11 ic i G m i β − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ    ( 01,2,...,i k= ) 
will decline. A relatively small k0 will result in their gen-
erative cognition being less than their dissonant cognition, 
and the escalation will be terminated quickly, indicating 
that lowV  also decreases. In other words, an increased G 
will indirectly increase lowV  in PPP projects or will at 
least not decrease lowV .
(4) When other parameters are fixed, an increase in 
generative cognition (S0) at the initial time can prompt 
investors to adopt a higher level of escalation behavior, re-
sulting in a larger lowV . A higher S0 implies that stronger 
faith has been invested in the PPP project. Since informa-
tion processing usually conforms to a stepwise reaction 
model, this procedure slows down given a higher S0. That 
is, investors will process more NF, thus improving lowV .
(5) The value lowV  is also directedly determined 
by investors’ behavioral preferences, including λ, β, om  
( 1,2o = ), pn  ( 1,2,3p = ) and ql  ( 1,2,3,4q = ). According 
to the critical condition shown in Eq. (10), an increased 
risk aversion coefficient λ or risk attitude coefficient β rep-
resents increased sensitivity to losses and risks, signify-
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Table 1. The definitions of variables related to the threshold for investors’ EOC
Symbols Range of values Definitions
0t 0 0t > Initial time of investment by investors
t 0t > The time of PPP projects after investment
k 0k >  and being a positive integer The amount of NF
0S 00 1S≤ ≤ Initial generative cognition of private investors
1kS − 10 1k kS S−≤ ≤ ≤ Investors’ generative cognition regarding the kth piece of NF
ka 0 1ka≤ ≤ The evidentiary weight of the kth piece of NF
kϕ 0 1k≤ ϕ ≤ The acceptance degree of the kth piece of NF
( )kS a ( )0 1kS a≤ ≤ The dissonant cognition of investors with the kth piece of NF
kw 0 1kw≤ ≤ The willingness to escalate by investors
kc 0kc > Sunk cost level
G 0 1G≤ ≤ The government guarantee degree
β 0 1≤β ≤ The risk attitude coefficient of investors
λ 1λ > The risk aversion coefficient
1n 1 0n < The linear coefficient between ϕk and wk
2n 2 0n < The linear coefficient between wk and ak
3n 3 0n > The linear coefficient between wk and G
1m 1 0m > The coefficient of quadratic function between ak and k
2m 2 0m < The coefficient of quadratic function between wk and ck
1l 10 1l≤ ≤ The intercept of function between ϕk and wk
2l 20 1l≤ ≤ The intercept of function between wk and ck
3l 30 1l≤ ≤ The intercept of function between wk and ak
4l 40 1l≤ ≤ The intercept of function between wk and G
1ζ 1 1 2 0n mζ = > The coefficient of quadratic function between ϕk and ck
2ζ 2 1 2 1 0n n mζ = > The coefficient of quadratic function between ϕk and k
3ζ 3 1 3 0n nζ = − > The linear coefficient between ϕk and G
4ζ ( )1 2 3 4 1 4n l l l l+ + + = ζ The intercept of function between ϕk and ck, k and G
0ε 01 0− ≤ ε ≤ The greatest degree of losses
o
R / R ( )
o
R f t= The return on investment for the PPP project
I 0I > The total investment of the project
lowV 0
o
0lowV I R= ⋅ ⋅ε < Termination threshold for investors’ EOC
ing that the investors’ dissonant cognition ( )21m k βλ  will 
increase and that ( ) ( )2 2 21 2 3 4 11 ic i G m i β − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ    
( 01,2,...,i k= ) will decrease. Similarly, when investors re-
ceive fewer pieces of NF, their generative cognition will 
be less than their dissonant cognition, and conversely, the 
escalation will be terminated quickly. However, if the co-
efficients 1ζ , 2ζ  and 4ζ  increase or the coefficient 3ζ  
declines, their dissonant cognition ( )21m k βλ  will not be 
influenced, but ( ) ( )2 2 21 2 3 4 11 ic i G m i β − ζ + ζ − ζ + ζ ⋅λ    
will decrease. Based on the stepwise reaction method, the 
equilibrium between investors’ generative and dissonant 
cognition will be reached upon receiving fewer pieces of 
NF in this case. Thus, the escalation behavior will be ter-
minated more rapidly, and thereby lowV  will be reduced.
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2.3. Project value with option in the EOC scenario
In PPP projects with investors’ EOC, early termination is 
inevitable. In such a scenario, investors have the right to 
require governments to take over the project in advance as 
initially agreed but with no obligations. It is possible that 
early termination will occur at any given time during the 
franchise period, and hence, the abandonment right that 
the investors hold is an American put option. As displayed 
in Figure 6, during the concession period (denoted by T), 
when the cumulative actual cash flows (denoted by iCFα ) 
are lower than the predicted cash flows (i.e., iCF ) by a 
certain extent as expressed in Eq. (14), the investors will 












≤ − χ ×∑ ∑ . (14)
where: χ is the difference between the cumulative actual 
and projected cash flows and tΙ  is the time at which the 
difference between the actual and predicted cash flows 
reaches χ. At this point, the net present value of the pro-
ject obtained by the investor ( INPV ) and the net present 
value of the project during its remaining concession pe-






























where: ir  is the discount rate.
With the abandonment option of early ter-
mination, the project value to the investors is 














∑ , where fr  is the risk-
free rate. If there is no flexibility in the policymaker layer, 
investors will not have put option and will have to operate 














∑ . When comparing the two 
opposite scenarios with and without flexibility, the differ-
ence in value for investors is the option value with early 
termination as follows:
( ) ( )1 11
T
at i
RO opt r t i
i t if
P CF








From the perspective of options, the option value is 
not less than zero, i.e., the termination price for investors 
must be sufficient to compensate for their residual cash 
flows during the remaining concession period from time 
1tΙ+  to time T , as follows:















On the other hand, government guarantees are typi-
cally deemed essential to formulate appropriate incentive 
mechanisms in PPP projects (Buyukyoran & Gundes, 
2018; Liu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2018). This requires the 
termination price to yield a proper return on investment 
to investors as the following prerequisites describe:

















Although governments shoulder social responsibility, 
the economic benefits of projects reflect, to some extent, 
project success and hence need to be ensured. That is, the 
net present value for governments after an advance pur-
chase is greater than zero as follows:














∑ ,  (20)
where: gNPV  represents the project value to governments 
when purchasing a project in advance and CT  is the life 
cycle of the project. Thus, considering both the investor 
and government conditions laid out in the above equa-
tions, the boundary conditions for the termination price 
in PPP projects can be inferred as follows:
( )
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In reality, private investors typically terminate EOC 
once the actual cash flows of PPP projects are small enough 










= − χ ×∑ ∑ . In this 
scenario, the range of atP  is:
T
: Actual cash flows













Figure 6. Cash flows for early termination in PPP projects with 
EOC
358 R. Gao, J. Liu. Value of investors’ escalation of commitment in PPP projects using real option thinking


































 + × −χ × − −χ × ≤
 + + 




The derivation of early termination prices up front 
serves as a valuable benchmark and a good starting point 
for both governments and investors during negotiations. 
Nonetheless, the final compensation (denoted by atPα ) 
agreed upon as specified in the concession agreement of 
early termination in PPP projects with investor’ EOC is 
also dependent on the bargaining power of each party. In 
this scenario, the actual option value ( ROVα ) that the in-
vestors own after negotiations is:











= − = −
++
∑ . (23)
Consequently, the value of a PPP project ( EOCV ) with 
option in the EOC scenario is:
( ) ( )0 1 1
t
i at
EOC r RO i t
i t i f
CF P








= + + = +
+ +
∑ .  (24)
The above parameters are summarized in Table  2. 
Briefly, when low EOCV V< , investors will continue to es-
calate their commitment to PPP projects, whereas when 
EOC lowV V≤ , the losses have increased beyond the range 
that investors will endure, and they will cease the escala-
tion and withdraw from the project.
3. Numerical example
To illustrate the application of the approach and facili-
tate understanding, this section demonstrates the mod-
els using a numerical example. The variables mentioned 
above can be divided into two categories: project- and 
investor-related variables. Project-related variables in-
clude the variables to be determined by governments and 
investors in advance after negotiations in PPP projects 
such as the expected return on investment (
o
R ). The total 
collective amount of investment made by the two sides is 
used to derive the investment level of PPP projects (I). In 
terms of investor-related variables, the behavioral prefer-
ences of private investors are relatively stable traits and 
are mostly held constant, but different investors usually 
have different preferences. Once appropriate investors are 
selected as partners in PPP projects, techniques can be 
used to measure their behavioral preferences. Ideally, as 
an agent to construct and operate PPP projects, investors 
can comprehend the status of the projects; the evidentiary 
weight of NF, i.e. the coefficient 1m  can be derived such 
as through management platform to analyze the collected 
information. In addition, attempts can be made to cali-
brate investors’ behavioral preferences kϕ  and wk, i.e., the 
coefficients 2m , pn  ( 1,2,3p = ) and ql  ( 1,2,3,4q = ). The 
behavioral preferences of private investors can primarily 
be captured through the past performance of previous 
PPP projects that they have participated in. Additionally, 
Table 2. The definitions of variables related to project value 
model with investors’ EOC
Symbols Definitions
iCF The predicted cash flows
iCFα The actual cash flows
χ The difference between the cumulative actual and 
projected cash flows
tΙ
The time at which the difference between the 
actual and predicted cash flows reaches χ
T The concession period
CT The life cycle of the project
INPV
The net present value of the project obtained by 
the investor
rNPV
The net present value of the project during its 
remaining concession period
optNPV The project value with expanded option to the investors
NPV The value of investors without options
gNPV The project value to governments when purchasing a project in advance
ir The discount rate
fr The risk-free rate
atP
The government compensation for early 
termination initiated by investors
atPα
The final early termination compensation agreed 
upon as specified in the concession agreement
K The net present value of Pat, i.e., the strike price of the put option
ROV The option value with early termination
ROVα
The actual option value that the investors own 
after negotiations
EOCV
The value of a PPP project with option in the 
EOC scenario
when using similar settings, laboratory experiments can 
be adopted to test the behavioral preferences of the chosen 
investors. Moreover, questionnaires or simulations could 
be designed to collect data if necessary.
Collectively, both project- and investor-related vari-
ables can be obtained through a series of records and 
some other attempts to simulate to present one possible 
situation. The relevant parameters are assigned as shown 
in Table  3. Assume that the expected return on invest-
ment (
o
R ) is agreed to be 6% and the total investment 
amounts to 10000 (in millions of units of currency dollars, 
for example), i.e., 6%R =  and 10000I = . Assume that 
1 0.001m = , 2 1m = − , 1 0.001n = − , 2 1n = − , 3 0.01n =  
and 1 2 3 4 0.01l l l l= = = = . The risk attitude coefficient is 
0.88, and the risk-aversion coefficient is 2.25, i.e., 0.88β =  
and 2.25λ =  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In PPP pro-
jects, the sunk cost level ck, government guarantee degree 
G and initial generative cognition of investors S0 will 
largely determine the threshold for investors’ EOC. Once 
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the amount of NF (k0) that the investors can sustain is 
known, the threshold ( lowV ) is determined. Th en, the re-
lationships between lowV  and k0 with ck, G and S0 will be 
discussed successively.
 Since ck gradually increases as the PPP project pro-
gresses, suppose that ck is an incremental arithmetic 
sequence based on c1 upon the fi rst piece of NF (e.g., 
1 0.1c = ). If the growth rate ( 1k kc c −− ) is diff erent, then 
ck is diff erent. First, when the level of government guar-
antee is fi xed (e.g., 0.35G = ), the relationship between k0
and 1k kc c −−  and S0 is depicted in Figure 7. Th e results 
reveal that k0 improves signifi cantly when S0 increases, but 
the decrease in k0 following an increase in 1k kc c −−  is less 
evident, and k0 remains unchanged because k0 is a positive 
integer. Th e results of the numerical simulation regarding 
the threshold lowV  to 1k kc c −−  and S0 is presented below 
(Figure 8). Th e overall trends of k0 and lowV  appear to 
follow a similar “step-like” pattern. However, contrary to 
the results for k0, lowV  clearly declines with the increase 
in S0, implying that the investors will delay the termina-
tion of EOC.















































Scenario 2 -1k kc c− 0.05
–
Figure 7. Relationship between k0, S0 and 1k kc c −−
Figure 8. Relationship between lowV , S0 and 1k kc c −−
When the sunk cost level ck of PPP projects is fi xed 
(e.g., -1 0.05k kc c− = ), Figure 9 indicates that k0 increases 
as S0 increases and will at least not decrease when G in-
creases. When G is unchanged, the eff ect of S0 on k0 is 
clear. By comparison, the infl uence of G in this scenario 
is relatively weak. In other words, investors’ escalation will 
be terminated more quickly with a change of S0 when both 
G and S0 change to the same degree. Likewise, based on 
k0 as mentioned above, the threshold ( lowV ) can be deter-
mined accordingly (Figure 10). In general, the trends of 
lowV  and k0 against changes of S0 and G are the exact op-
posite. When S0 or G increases, k0 will be larger (or at least 
not decrease because it is a positive integer), which means 
that the degree of EOC by investors will be severer. Since 
0lowV < , then lowV  will decline instead. From this per-
spective, the government guarantee is a critical issue and 
should be attributed considerable importance. When the 
government guarantee is at the appropriate level, the ter-
mination threshold ( lowV ) for investors’ EOC will remain 
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unchanged. However, excessive guarantees will not only 
increase the project value, including the expanded value 
(i.e., EOCV ), and delay the termination of the escalation 
but also aggravate the fi nancial burden. As a result, gov-
ernments should formulate a reasonable guarantee mecha-
nism for EOC to eff ectively de-escalate commitment.
Th e numerical simulation further confi rms that inves-
tors’ generative cognition initially (S0) directly determines 
whether to terminate EOC to some extent. Consequently, 
when investing PPP projects by private investors, both 
governments and investors should agree on the project 
during negotiations, which ought to be specifi ed in the 
contract, to collectively work toward creating a correct 
cognition of PPP projects. It is worth noting that when 
diff erent values are assigned in the above models, the dia-
grams might change. Th e numerical example in this sec-
tion only analyzes one possible hypothetical sc enario to 
verify the eff ectiveness of the proposed models.
Conclusions
In PPP projects, investors oft en escalate the commitment 
in response to NF and generally presuppose a psycho-
logical threshold simultaneously. Once the losses from 
escalation reach this threshold, investors will terminate 
EOC and transfer projects to governments. Th e paper il-
lustrates the maximum amount of NF acceptable to in-
vestors ( 0k ) using the belief-adjustment model, followed 
by the analysis of the termination threshold ( lowV ). By 
treating the investors’ right to abandon PPP projects in 
an EOC scenario as a put option, the project value for 
investors’ EOC ( EOCV ) is constructed using real option 
thinking. Diff erent from the traditional real option meth-
od, the critical value discussed in the EOC scenario al-
lows for some losses, i.e., the threshold is less than zero 
( 0lowV < ). Th e results show that the threshold correlates 
with the initial generative cognition ( 0S ), sunk cost level 
( kc ), government guarantee degree (G ) and investors’ 
behavioral preferences as well as with total investment 
( I ) and return on investment ( R ). In such an escalation 
scenario, when the value of PPP projects is greater than 
the threshold, i.e., EOC lowV V≥ , investors will persist in 
escalating their commitment. Conversely, if the value is 
less than the threshold, i.e., EOC lowV V< , investors will 
terminate EOC and abandon the projects, thereby trans-
ferring them to governments to receive compensation or 
the residual asset value.
Since EOC causes losses for investors and govern-
ments and is not conducive to the sustainable develop-
ment of PPP schemes, both parties should utilize appro-
priate means to de-escalate commitment. Total investment 
( I ) should be accurately estimated, and the return on in-
vestment ( R ) should be negotiated to ensure reasonable-
ness. For private investors, it is not always the case that 
a higher expected return on investment ( R ) is better; a 
higher R  could increase the range of lowV  and further 
increase project losses. During negotiations over PPP pro-
jects, both governments and investors should agree on the 
project ( 0S ) that should be specifi ed in the contract in as 
much detail as possible to collectively work toward creat-
ing a correct understanding of PPP projects. Moreover, 
improving the evidentiary weight of NF ( ka ), by for ex-
ample shortening the cycle for gathering information and 
improving the accuracy and transparency of project in-
formation feedback, is an eff ective measure for effi  ciently 
intervening in EOC.
In summary, by considering managerial behavior and 
resolving barriers to ensuring that investors make their 
decisions from a rational and probabilistic perspective, 
the contributions of this paper are to incorporate the sub-
jective escalation behavior of investors into PPP projects 
and further to move beyond the standard of real option 
method by allowing the threshold to be less than zero in 
the EOC scenario. Finally, the limitations should be high-
lighted. First, the purpose of the numerical example pre-
sented in this article is to describe the proposed model 
Figure 9. Relationship between k0, S0 and G
Figure 10. Relationship between lowV , S0 and G
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more intuitively and verify its effectiveness. Due to the 
confidentiality of data in PPP projects, first-hand data on 
some actual PPP projects are not available and thus cannot 
be quantified to conduct case study. More importantly, the 
numerical example only analyzes one possible hypotheti-
cal scenario because the behavioral preferences of private 
investors are difficult to observe at this stage. Potentially, 
with the development of management, psychology and be-
havioral economics as well as advanced technology, such 
behavioral preferences will be captured quite comprehen-
sively and precisely. Such analysis can be considered in 
future research. Still, the findings in this paper yield new 
insights for efficient governance to help governments de-
escalate investors’ commitment in PPP projects.
Funding
This work was supported by the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China under Grant [number 71571149].
Disclosure statement
The authors declared that they have no conflict of interest.
References
Almassi, A., McCabe, B., & Thompson, M. (2012). Real options-
based approach for valuation of government guarantees in 
public-private partnerships. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 
19(2), 196−204. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000117
Aretz, K., & Pope, P. F. (2018). Real options models of the firm, 
capacity overhang, and the cross section of stock returns. 
Journal of Finance, 73(3), 1363−1415. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12617
Ashuri, B., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K. R., Lee, S., & Lu, J. (2011). 
Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating BOT highway 
projects with government minimum revenue guarantee op-
tions. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
138(4), 545−557. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000447
Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D. K., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. L. (2017). 
Options-based negotiation management of PPP-BOT infra-
structure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 
35(11−12), 676−692. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Berg,  J.  E., Dickhaut,  J.  W., & Kanodia, C. (2009). The role of 
information asymmetry in escalation phenomena: empirical 
evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
69(2), 135−147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.07.007
Biygautane, M., Neesham, C., & Al-Yahya, K. O. (2019). Insti-
tutional entrepreneurship and infrastructure public-private 
partnership (PPP): unpacking the role of social actors in 
implementing PPP projects. International Journal of Project 
Management, 37(1), 192−219. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.12.005
Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Economet-
rica, 77(3), 623−685. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA6248
Bobocel, D. R., & Meyer, J. P. (1994). Escalating commitment to 
a failing course of action: separating the roles of choice and 
justification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(3), 360−363. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.79.3.360
Boulding, W., Guha, A., & Staelin, R. (2016). Do we really need 
to change the decision maker? Counterintuitive escalation of 
commitment results in real options contexts. Management 
Science, 63(10), 3459−3472. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2475
Brandão,  L.  E., Bastian-Pinto, C., Gomes,  L.  L., & Labes, M. 
(2012). Government supports in public-private partnership 
contracts: Metro Line 4 of the Sao Paulo Subway System. 
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 18(3), 218−225. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000095
Brockner, J. (1992). The escalation of commitment to a failing 
course of action: toward theoretical progress. Academy of 
Management Review, 17(1), 39−61. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1992.4279568
Brouthers, K. D., & Dikova, D. (2010). Acquisitions and real op-
tions: the greenfield alternative. Journal of Management Stud-
ies, 47(6), 1048−1071. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00875.x
Buyukyoran, F., & Gundes, S. (2018). Optimized real options-
based approach for government guarantees in PPP toll road 
projects. Construction Management and Economics, 36(4), 
203−216. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1347267
Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2018). Revenue guarantee in 
public–private partnerships: a win–win model. Construction 
Management and Economics, 36(10), 584−598. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1467028
Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2019). The role of public private 
partnerships in fostering innovation. Construction Manage-
ment and Economics, 38(2), 140–1561. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2019.1610184
Chung, S. H., & Cheng, K. C. (2018). How does cognitive dis-
sonance influence the sunk cost effect? Psychology Research 
and Behavior Management, 11, 37–45. 
https://doi.org/10.2147/PRBM.S150494
Collan, M., Haahtela, T., & Kyläheiko, K. (2016). On the usability 
of real option valuation model types under different types of 
uncertainty. International Journal of Business Innovation and 
Research, 11(1), 18–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBIR.2016.077608
Cruz, C. O., & Marques, R. C. (2013). Flexible contracts to cope 
with uncertainty in public-private partnerships. International 
Journal of Project Management, 31(3), 473–483. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.09.006
Dahan, E., & Mendelson, H. (2001). An extreme-value model of 
concept testing. Management Science, 47(1), 102–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.1.102.10666
Drummond, H. (2014). Escalation of commitment: when to 
stay the course? Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(4), 
430–446. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2013.0039
Feldman, G., & Wong, K.  F.  E. (2018). When action-inaction 
framing leads to higher escalation of commitment: a new 
inaction-effect perspective on the sunk-cost fallacy. Psycho-
logical Science, 29(4), 537–548. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617739368
Feng, Z., Zhang, S. B., & Gao, Y. (2015). Modeling the impact 
of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and 
capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 78, 54–
67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2015.05.006
Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). 
Stanford University Press.
362 R. Gao, J. Liu. Value of investors’ escalation of commitment in PPP projects using real option thinking
Galera, A. L. L., & Soliño, A. S. (2010). A real options approach 
for the valuation of highway concessions. Transportation Sci-
ence, 44(3), 416–427. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1090.0299
Garvin, M. J., & Ford, D. N. (2012). Real options in infrastruc-
ture projects: theory, practice and prospects. Engineering Pro-
ject Organization Journal, 2(1–2), 97–108. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21573727.2011.632096
Guo, K., Zhang, L., & Wang, T. (2019). Optimal scheme in en-
ergy performance contracting under uncertainty: a real op-
tion perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, 231, 240–253. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.05.218
Hafenbrädl, S., & Woike, J. K. (2018). Competitive escalation and 
interventions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 31(5), 
695–714. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2084
Heath, C. (1995). Escalation and de-escalation of commitment 
in response to sunk costs: the role of budgeting in mental ac-
counting. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 62(1), 38–54. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1029
Herder, P. M., de Joode, J., Ligtvoet, A., Schenk, S., & Taneja, P. 
(2011). Buying real options-valuing uncertainty in infrastruc-
ture planning. Futures, 43(9), 961–969. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2011.06.005
Hogarth, R. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1992). Order effects in belief 
updating: the belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology, 
24(1), 1–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(92)90002-J
Hsieh, K. Y., Tsai, W., & Chen, M. J. (2015). If they can do it, why 
not us? Competitors as reference points for justifying escala-
tion of commitment. Academy of Management Journal, 58(1), 
38–58. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2011.0869
Iossa, E., Spagnolo, G., & Vellez, M. (2007). Best practices on con-
tract design in public-private partnerships (Working Paper). 
World Bank.
Jani, A. (2008). An experimental investigation of factors influ-
encing perceived control over a failing IT project. Interna-
tional Journal of Project Management, 26(7), 726–732. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.06.004
Jani, A. (2011). Escalation of commitment in troubled IT pro-
jects: influence of project risk factors and self-efficacy on the 
perception of risk and the commitment to a failing project. 
International Journal of Project Management, 29(7), 934–945. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.08.004
Jeong, J., Ji, C., Hong, T., & Park, H. S. (2015). Model for evalu-
ating the financial viability of the BOT project for highway 
service areas in South Korea. Journal of Management in Engi-
neering, 32(2), 04015036. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000396
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analy-
sis of decision under risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society, 263–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814417358_0006
Karlsson, N., Gärling, T., & Bonini, N. (2005). Escalation of com-
mitment with transparent future outcomes. Experimental Psy-
chology, 52(1), 67–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.52.1.67
Keil, M., Rai, A., Mann, J. C., & Zhang, G. P. (2003). Why soft-
ware projects escalate: the importance of project management 
constructs. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 
50(3), 251–261. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2003.817312
Keil, M., Tan, B. C., Wei, K. K., Saarinen, T., Tuunainen, V., & 
Wassenaar, A. (2000). A cross-cultural study on escalation of 
commitment behavior in software projects. MIS Quarterly, 
24(2), 299–325. https://doi.org/10.2307/3250940
Keil, M., Truex, D. P., & Mixon, R. (1995). The effects of sunk 
cost and project completion on information technology pro-
ject escalation. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Manage-
ment, 42(4), 372–381. https://doi.org/10.1109/17.482086
Kiesler, C. A. (1971). The psychology of commitment: experiments 
linking behavior to belief. Academic Press.
Krüger, N. A. (2012). To kill a real option–incomplete contracts, real 
options and PPP. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Prac-
tice, 46(8), 1359–1371. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2012.04.009
Ku, G., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2005). Towards a com-
petitive arousal model of decision-making: a study of auction 
fever in live and Internet auctions. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 96(2), 89–103. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.10.001
Lee, J. S., Keil, M., & Wong, K. F. E. (2018). Does a tired mind 
help avoid a decision bias? The effect of ego depletion on es-
calation of commitment. Applied Psychology, 67(1), 171–185. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/apps.12109
Li, S., Abraham, D., & Cai, H. (2017). Infrastructure financing 
with project bond and credit default swap under public-pri-
vate partnerships. International Journal of Project Manage-
ment, 35(3), 406–419. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2017.01.005
Liu, J., Gao, R., & Cheah, Y. J. (2017). Pricing mechanism of early 
termination of PPP projects based on real option theory. Jour-
nal of Management in Engineering, 33(6), 04017035. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000556
Liu, J., Liu, J., Gao, R., Gao, H. O., & Li, Y. (2019a). Identifying 
project factors that affect an investor’s escalation of commit-
ment in public-private partnership projects. Project Manage-
ment Journal, 50(6), 686–698. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/8756972819847874
Liu, J., Yu, X., & Cheah, C.  Y.  J. (2014). Evaluation of restric-
tive competition in PPP projects using real option approach. 
International Journal of Project Management, 32(3), 473–481. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007
Liu, S., Jin, H., Liu, C., Xie, B., & Mills, A. (2019b). Government 
compensation and costs of non-competition guarantee for 
PPP rental retirement villages. Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management, 27(1), 128–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-01-2019-0063
Martins, J., Marques, R. C., & Cruz, C. O. (2013). Real options in 
infrastructure: revisiting the literature. Journal of Infrastruc-
ture Systems, 21(1), 04014026. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000188
Marzouk, M., & Ali, M. (2018). Mitigating risks in wastewater 
treatment plant PPPs using minimum revenue guarantee and 
real options. Utilities Policy, 53, 121–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2018.06.012
McCain, B. E. (1986). Continuing investment under conditions 
of failure: a laboratory study of the limits to escalation. Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, 71(2), 280–284. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.71.2.280
Montealegre, R., & Keil, M. (2000). De-escalating information 
technology projects: lessons from the Denver International 
Airport. MIS Quarterly, 24(3), 417–447. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/3250968
Moon, H. (2001). Looking forward and looking back: integrat-
ing completion and sunk-cost effects within an escalation-of-
commitment progress decision. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
86(1), 104–113. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-9010.86.1.104
Moon, H., Conlon,  D.  E., Humphrey,  S.  E., Quigley, N., De-
vers, C. E., & Nowakowski, J. M. (2003a). Group decision pro-
cess and incrementalism in organizational decision making. Or-
ganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 92(1–2), 
67–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00079-7
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 24(5): 348–364 363
Moon, H., Hollenbeck,  J.  R., Humphrey,  S.  E., & Maue, B. 
(2003b). The tripartite model of neuroticism and the sup-
pression of depression and anxiety within an escalation of 
commitment dilemma. Journal of Personality, 71(3), 347–368. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.7103004
Morreale, A., Robba, S., Nigro, G. L., & Roma, P. (2017). A real 
options game of alliance timing decisions in biopharmaceu-
tical research and development. European Journal of Opera-
tional Research, 261(3), 1189–1202. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.03.025
Nunes, C., & Pimentel, R. (2017). Analytical solution for an in-
vestment problem under uncertainties with shocks. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 259(3), 1054–1063. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.008
Oh, H., & Yoon, C. (2020). Time to build and the real-options 
channel of residential investment. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 135(1), 255–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.10.019
Osei-Kyei, R., & Chan, A. P. (2018). Stakeholders’ perspectives 
on the success criteria for public-private partnership projects. 
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 22(2), 
131–142. https://doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2018.444
Pan, G., & Pan, S. L. (2011). Transition to IS project de-escala-
tion: an exploration into management executives’ influence 
behaviors. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 
58(1), 109–123. https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2010.2048908
Pan, G., Pan,  S.  L., & Newman, M. (2009). Managing infor-
mation technology project escalation and de-escalation: an 
approach-avoidance perspective. IEEE Transactions on Engi-
neering Management, 56(1), 76–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2008.922638
Pan, S. L., Pan, G. S., Newman, M., & Flynn, D. (2006). Escala-
tion and de-escalation of commitment to information systems 
projects: insights from a project evaluation model. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 173(3), 1139–1160. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.07.009
Pellegrino, R., Carbonara, N., & Costantino, N. (2019). Public 
guarantees for mitigating interest rate risk in PPP projects. 
Built Environment Project and Asset Management, 9(2), 248–
261. https://doi.org/10.1108/BEPAM-01-2018-0012
Ross, J., & Staw, B. M. (1993). Organizational escalation and exit: 
lessons from the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(4), 701–732. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/256756
Rutten,  M.  E., Dorée,  A.  G., & Halman,  J.  I. (2014). Together 
on the path to construction innovation: yet another example 
of escalation of commitment? Construction Management and 
Economics, 32(7–8), 695–704. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2014.933855
Sarangee, K. R., Schmidt,  J. B., & Calantone, R.  J. (2019). An-
ticipated regret and escalation of commitment to failing, new 
product development projects in business markets. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 76, 157–168. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2018.08.008
Schaumberg, R. L., & Wiltermuth, S. S. (2014). Desire for a posi-
tive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment 
to initiatives with prosocial aims. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 123(2), 110–123. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.10.012
Sleesman,  D.  J., Conlon,  D.  E., McNamara, G., & Miles,  J.  E. 
(2012). Cleaning up the big muddy: a meta-analytic review 
of the determinants of escalation of commitment. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55(3), 541–562. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj
Sleesman, D. J., Lennard, A. C., McNamara, G., & Conlon, D. E. 
(2018). Putting escalation of commitment in context: a mul-
tilevel review and analysis. Academy of Management Annals, 
12(1), 178–207. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2016.0046
Song, J., Song, D., & Zhang, D. (2015). Modeling the concession 
period and subsidy for B waste-to-energy incineration pro-
jects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
141(10), 04015033. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001005
Song, J., Hu, Y., & Feng, Z. (2018). Factors influencing early ter-
mination of PPP projects in China. Journal of Management in 
Engineering, 34(1), 05017008. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000572
Staats, B. R., Kc, D. S., & Gino, F. (2018). Maintaining beliefs in 
the face of negative news: the moderating role of experience. 
Management Science, 64(2), 804–824. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2640
Staw, B. M. (1976). Knee-deep in the big muddy: a study of es-
calating commitment to a chosen course of action. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(1), 27–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90005-2
Staw, B. M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course 
of action. Academy of Management Review, 6(4), 577–587. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981.4285694
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1987). Behavior in escalation situations: 
antecedents, prototypes and solutions. Research in Organiza-
tional Behavior, 9(4), 39–78. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb055578
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1989). Understanding behavior in escala-
tion situations. Science, 246(4927), 216–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.246.4927.216
Tan,  B.  C., Smith,  H.  J., Keil, M., & Montealegre, R. (2003). 
Reporting bad news about software projects: impact of or-
ganizational climate and information asymmetry in an indi-
vidualistic and a collectivistic culture. IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 50(1), 64–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2002.808292
Tang, Y., & Liu, Z. (2008). Decision responsibility, generative 
cognition, escalation of commitment in capital budgeting 
decision: an experimental research based on role-playing ex-
periments. Nankai Business Review, (1), 45–48.
Triantis, A. (2005). Realizing the potential of real options: does 
theory meet practice? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
17(2), 8–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2005.00028.x
Trigeorgis, L., & Tsekrekos,  A.  E. (2018). Real options in op-
erations research: a review. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 270(1), 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.055
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect the-
ory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297–323. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
Valipour, A., Yahaya, N., Noor,  N.  M., Valipour, I., & 
Tamošaitienė, J. (2019). A SWARA-COPRAS approach to the 
allocation of risk in water and sewerage public-private part-
nership projects in Malaysia. International Journal of Strategic 
Property Management, 23(4), 269–283. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2019.8066
Villani, E., Greco, L., & Phillips, N. (2017). Understanding value 
creation in public-private partnerships: a comparative case 
study. Journal of Management Studies, 54(6), 876–905. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12270
Vroom, V. (1964). Expectancy theory. Work and motivation. 
Wiley.
364 R. Gao, J. Liu. Value of investors’ escalation of commitment in PPP projects using real option thinking
Wang, Y., Cui, P., & Liu, J. (2018). Analysis of the risk-sharing 
ratio in PPP projects based on government minimum rev-
enue guarantees. International Journal of Project Management, 
36(6), 899–909. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman. 2018.01.007
Wang, Y., Gao, H. O., & Liu, J. (2019). Incentive game of investor 
speculation in PPP highway projects based on the govern-
ment minimum revenue guarantee. Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice, 125, 20–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2019.05.006
Wang, Y., & Liu, J. (2015). Evaluation of the excess revenue shar-
ing ratio in PPP projects using principal-agent models. In-
ternational Journal of Project Management, 33(6), 1317–1324. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.03.002
Westfall,  J.  E., Jasper,  J.  D., & Christman, S. (2012). Inaction 
inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: avoiding the 
losses of past decisions. Brain and Cognition, 80(2), 192–200. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2012.06.003
Whyte, G. (1986). Escalating commitment to a course of action: 
a reinterpretation. Academy of Management Review, 11(2), 
311–321. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1986.4283111
Winch, G. M. (2013). Escalation in major projects: lessons from 
the Channel Fixed Link. International Journal of Project Man-
agement, 31(5), 724–734. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.01.012
Wong, K. F. E. (2005). The role of risk in making decisions un-
der escalation situations. Applied Psychology, 54(4), 584–607. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2005.00236.x
Wong, K.  F.  E., & Kwong,  J.  Y. (2007). The role of anticipated 
regret in escalation of commitment. Journal of Applied Psy-
chology, 92(2), 545–554. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.2.545
Wong, K. F. E., & Kwong, J. Y. (2018). Resolving the judgment 
and decision-making paradox between adaptive learning and 
escalation of commitment. Management Science, 64(4), 1911–
1925. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc. 2016.2686
Wong, K. F. E., Kwong, J. Y. Y., & Ng, C. K. (2008). When think-
ing rationally increases biases: the role of rational thinking 
style in escalation of commitment. Applied Psychology, 57(2), 
246–271. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2007.00309.x
Xiong, W., Zhang, X., & Chen, H. (2015). Early-termination com-
pensation in public-private partnership projects. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 142(4), 04015098. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001084
Yao, X., Fan, Y., Xu, Y., Zhang, X., Zhu, L., & Feng, L. (2019). 
Is it worth to invest? - An evaluation of CTL-CCS project in 
China based on real options. Energy, 182(1), 920–931. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.06.100
Yu, S., Li, Z., Wei, Y. M., & Liu, L. (2019). A real option model 
for geothermal heating investment decision making: consid-
ering carbon trading and resource taxes. Energy, 189, 116252. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.116252
Zapata Quimbayo, C. A., Mejía Vega, C. A., & Marques, N. L. 
(2019). Minimum revenue guarantees valuation in PPP pro-
jects under a mean reverting process. Construction Manage-
ment and Economics, 37(3), 121–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1500024
Zardkoohi, A. (2004). Do real options lead to escalation of com-
mitment? Academy of Management Review, 29(1), 111–119. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2004.11851733
Zhang,  G.  P., Keil, M., Rai, A., & Mann, J. (2003). Predicting 
information technology project escalation: a neural network 
approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 146(1), 
115–129. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00294-1
